The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.
Devices running only local accounts are not affected.



Reminds me of the classic exploit of going to the help on the login page of Windows 98 or 2000 and from there launching anything you want. What is old is new again, I guess.
I’m not sure why the article talks about bitlocker, though, it’s not related to this in any way.
I remember there was a script you could run from a bootable floppy that would give you the local admin password for Windows 2000, then I’d use that to patch the Windows 2000 PCs in my high school lab so that it gave a fake ctrl-alt-del login, and keylogged all login entries to a local file. One day the teacher logged in, and I had his network admin. From there we got all the answers to the exams for the rest of the year. The class average was 97, and they gave us awards in the auditorium stage at the end of the year.
You deserved it
It’s related in the sense that the drive was unlocked at boot and stays unlocked when the screen is locked. This allows then to copy files off the drive from the lock screen, whereas ideally the lock screen would be completely isolated and not able to access the user’s files.
I suspect it will be very difficult to actually fix that part, because you can get notifications and such on the lock screen, needing access to said files.
The lock screen is not really a security boundary. It’s a convenience at best. Once a system is booted into windows, it’s running all kinds of services that are exploitable over the network, too. And if you can log on as another user, you can exploit local services.
If you want to protect a system, enable full disk encryption with a strong password and shut it down. (Assuming there aren’t other vulnerabilities in bitlocker, again.)
I was just pointing out what relevance Bitlocker (a disk encryption system) had to do with anything. It’s mentioned in the article.
I’m not a security expert, but I presume that when that level is security is required, it would be possible to build such a system that does do a complete lockdown when the screen is locked. That wasn’t the subject of my comment, though.
This is like saying “if you want to have safe sex, put a condom on and never have sex.”
Devices should have ACLs in place at the file system level, be encrypted without proper credentials, and deny access from unspecified locations.
Deny all and allow only what’s specified.