Obviously not. Do you store your false equivalency fallacies on the internet in clear text? Apparently so, but I won’t call you stupid for it.
How do passwords get stored? Encrypted.
How do they get read? Decrypted.
What performs the encryption? Keys.
What can the keys be derived from? Passwords.
Where are those keys stored? On the damned device.
Are you telling me, fuck all to the popular mantra that: if they have physical access to device, you’re boned?
State sponsored forensic programs bypass TPM and shit all the time, requiring physical access.
So where is your hypothetical security coming from? To me, it sounds like you’re needlessly giving me a hard time on a subject I probably understand better than you.
A one-way function can make recovering a secret computationally infeasible, but it doesn’t eliminate the implications of allowing the device to decrypt its own data.
I presume you’re referring to a workflow where a password is put into the device, fed through a one way function to derive the key, then the key is used. So the key is derived and never stored on disk.
Nonetheless, your key was in memory. There’s an attack surface for any forensic team. There’s also the capability of trying to brute force the password in a virtual environment after having cloned the device. FBI did this to an iPhone that had full reset after 10 failed attempts.
There’s also the capability to compromise the OS, leave the device there, wait for an admin to come by and supply the password themselves.
I don’t really see how the manner by which you derive your key affects the fact that having the key on device is a vulnerability. It may mitigate the vulnerability but you’re talking about corporations and government entities with practically unlimited budgeting. If the vulnerability exists, it will be explored.
I still think my points stands. It would be stupid for someone committing espionage to allow the same device to also decrypt the data.
You originally asked what the point is of a self encrypting device. Even assuming this particular device in question has the attack vector you pointed out (I don’t know, I haven’t checked), it isn’t pointless.
Your attack vector assumes the key is in memory. That would be a very odd and weird design that I’ve never seen… The auth key is usually stored on cryptographically secure hardware (a tpm), you unlock it at boot and it talks to the drive, the OS doesn’t know about it or see it.
There’s technically an attack vector there, an unproven one that assumes they have a backdoor or an undisclosed flaw at the hardware level… so sure, if you really really don’t want to risk it, encrypt your data yourself.
There are a lot of reasons to choose these devices:
Performance
Nothing to configure os side, you just write to it and it’s encrypted. Power loss means it cannot be decrypted by a malicious actor.
Disposal. You can often issue a single command that scrambles the auth key and now all the data is unrecoverable without you needing to write every byte.
Honestly I wouldn’t even waste my time. That guy seems like a complete asshole, who wants to sound smart but doesn’t even understand what you’re saying.
Encryption being a one way algorithm means nothing in the context of your original concern.
No
Oh… so how do you decrypt your data without a decryption key? Don’t tell me you use a password…
Do you store your password on the device in cleartext? Thats stupid.
Just no, youre plain wrong.
Obviously not. Do you store your false equivalency fallacies on the internet in clear text? Apparently so, but I won’t call you stupid for it.
Are you telling me, fuck all to the popular mantra that: if they have physical access to device, you’re boned?
State sponsored forensic programs bypass TPM and shit all the time, requiring physical access.
So where is your hypothetical security coming from? To me, it sounds like you’re needlessly giving me a hard time on a subject I probably understand better than you.
Sigh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way_function?wprov=sfla1
A one-way function can make recovering a secret computationally infeasible, but it doesn’t eliminate the implications of allowing the device to decrypt its own data.
I presume you’re referring to a workflow where a password is put into the device, fed through a one way function to derive the key, then the key is used. So the key is derived and never stored on disk.
Nonetheless, your key was in memory. There’s an attack surface for any forensic team. There’s also the capability of trying to brute force the password in a virtual environment after having cloned the device. FBI did this to an iPhone that had full reset after 10 failed attempts.
There’s also the capability to compromise the OS, leave the device there, wait for an admin to come by and supply the password themselves.
I don’t really see how the manner by which you derive your key affects the fact that having the key on device is a vulnerability. It may mitigate the vulnerability but you’re talking about corporations and government entities with practically unlimited budgeting. If the vulnerability exists, it will be explored.
I still think my points stands. It would be stupid for someone committing espionage to allow the same device to also decrypt the data.
You originally asked what the point is of a self encrypting device. Even assuming this particular device in question has the attack vector you pointed out (I don’t know, I haven’t checked), it isn’t pointless.
Your attack vector assumes the key is in memory. That would be a very odd and weird design that I’ve never seen… The auth key is usually stored on cryptographically secure hardware (a tpm), you unlock it at boot and it talks to the drive, the OS doesn’t know about it or see it.
There’s technically an attack vector there, an unproven one that assumes they have a backdoor or an undisclosed flaw at the hardware level… so sure, if you really really don’t want to risk it, encrypt your data yourself.
There are a lot of reasons to choose these devices:
Honestly I wouldn’t even waste my time. That guy seems like a complete asshole, who wants to sound smart but doesn’t even understand what you’re saying.
Encryption being a one way algorithm means nothing in the context of your original concern.